Abstract
Over recent times, Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have been increasingly growing as a dominant force in the financial world. However, so far, very little has been documented about the SWFs (Fotak et al., 2008, p.2); and in the sporadic writings where they have been mentioned, they are mostly portrayed in the negative limelight (p.7). Kotak et al. (2008, p.25) furthermore say that “Overall, the studies regarding stabilization funds are inconclusive in terms of size – it is still unclear whether stabilization funds truly are overcapitalized. The need for careful regulation and insulation of the funds from political influence emerges clearly and is directly applicable to SWFs.”
It is for these reasons that this paper vigilantly focuses on accentuating the positive sides of SWFs while, concurrently, spotlighting the negative sides (especially the ones that have developed over the recent years and have not yet been critically analyzed. Additionally, and more importantly, the paper gets to pinpointedly show the connection between the sky-rocketing growths of the SWFs and numerous vital aspects of corporate governance. This is mainly going to be in terms of the implications that this growth has had over the past, present, and prospectively; in the future.
This write-up is structured as follows. Section I gives a brief introduction as well as giving a background for the study as well as a literature review of the existing information on the subject of SWFs about corporate governance. Section II then gives a panoramic analysis into the concept of SWFs, their characteristics, and reasons for growth, while, concomitantly walking us in the world of corporate governance, structures, laws, policies, and even practices.
Section III quickly follows up on what has been stated in section II by giving concise positive and negative implications of SWFs on corporate governance. Finally, section four gives a conclusion which mainly addresses the way forward in healing the ailments associated with the symbiotic relationship of corporate governance and the ever-growing SWFs.
Methodology
This manuscript involves the use of salient data collection and analysis techniques (with informative articles on SWF and Corporate structures being the primary sources of information). After collecting the data, I conducted an empirical analysis on the data with relevance to the topic of “Implications of the growth of sovereign wealth funds for corporate governance structure and practices.” After I had the necessary data that I needed, I qualitatively re-analyzed them, this time, noting down their similarities, differences, patterns, and trends in the literature to have precise information that would validate my writings.
The information finally presented below is consequently well researched from authoritative scholarly write-ups blended with my professional opinion thus making this article critically invaluable for academicians as well as economic researchers. Notably, most emphases were laid on the topic in question rather than just looking at financial economics in general.
Introduction
In general terms, Fotak et al. (2008, p.1) simply define SWFs as “State-owned investment funds investing in search of commercial returns.” Essentially, this definition emphasizes the important aspects of SWFs which are: they are owned by individual countries and are primarily established to offer a soft financial cushion for tough economic times, or elementarily, bring more revenue to these countries.
Wise Geek (n.d) on the other hand says that “Corporate governance is a broad term that has to do with how the rights and responsibilities are shared among owners, managers, and shareholders of a given company.”
Fundamentally, this simply means that the structure put in place to govern any corporation greatly demarcates its boundaries, privileges, corporate responsibilities and duties, and more importantly, how these organizations get to relate with others within or outside their organization. It is noteworthy to state that the model of corporate governance in any institution is dictated by state rules as well as regulations from other bodies that are placed in charge of their operations. In turn, this makes them know what to do and what to ignore; while, at the same time, facilitating the smooth running of those organizations (Rumu, 2010). About the SWFs, Corporate governance plays the essential role of acting as the channel for making investments (Truman 2007).
As of today, these funds are amassed to control more than three trillion US dollars (US$3), in assets, thus making them able to easily “calm and roil international financial markets” at will (Fotak et al, 2008, p.1 and Drezner, 2008).
The latest researches reveal that there are several SWFs in existence with the most outspoken ones including government pensions fund (Norway), Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (UAE), China Investment Corporation (China), Kuwait Investment Authority (Kuwait), and Temasek Holdings Pte. Limited (Singapore) among many others (Behrendt, 2010). Kotak et al (2008, p.2) say that despite not being actively reported by the media, these funds corporations “have been actively and successfully investing around the world for decades” and their mutual relationship with various corporate governance structures is likely to grow with shooting up of oil prices. It is inherently important to note that many large oil-producing countries are also the largest sponsors of SWFs (Truman, 2007).
Background and literature review
Several examples abound from varied literature to attest to this financial control of SWFs as well as on other salient issues with regards to the mutual relationship between the growth of the funds and corporate governance. To begin with; SWFs are documented to have rescued the collapsing western banking system during the pronounced subprime mortgage crisis through their $60 billion purchase of Stock in Euro-American banks (Fotak et al., 2008, p.1). Similarly, the active involvement of US corporate governance sectors with SWFs after the 1980-1982 and 1990-1991 recessions greatly helped in resuscitating the spiral downward dwindling of their economy (p.25).
Likewise, Fotak et al. (2008) report that the $3 billion purchase of nonvoting equity by the Blackstone group immensely assisted in firming the shaky economy in 2008 (p.1).
Moreover, even though most SWFs claim that their objectives are purely investment-oriented; many of them have been widely documented to be actively involved in political activities and corporate governance (Fotak et al., 2008, p.2). Drezner (2008) supports these political concerns by saying that “Many policy analysts argue that SWFs are symptomatic of shifts in the global distribution of power away from the advanced industrialized states and towards authoritarian, capitalist governments in the developing world.”
In addition, the prolonged discussions conducted in 2007 by the US Congress (specifically the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs); on how to deal with the rapid unchecked growth of SWFs also exemplifies the vast political concerns (Fotak et al., 2008, p.6). The meeting is reported to have “stressed the benefits of foreign investment in the United States, but also called for an increased level of transparency by SWFs, as a means to prevent excessive protectionism of national markets” all over the world (p.6-7). So what are these SWFs, how were they formed and where do they get the financial funds that give them the immense control that they dictate in the current world?
What are Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs)?
A representative definition is advanced by Teslik (2009) who ascribes to the definition by the U.S treasury which says that SWFs “Are government investment funds, funded by foreign currency reserves but managed separately from official currency reserves.” More easily put; they are pools that are used by various nations in making investments to bring positive financial returns. The investments can be done nationally or multi-nationally depending on what the investors decide o.
This definition adds more meat to the aforementioned skeletal description given by Fotak et al. From the latter advancement, we get to know that despite SWFs being state-owned, their management is importantly done separately from the countries’ official currency reserves. This is probably the reason why their operations tend to be more independent and less vocalized in tabloids as opposed to other state-owned investments.
The initial purpose of the SWFs was revenue stabilization—probably the reason why they were previously called stabilization funds, nonrenewable resource funds, and trust funds (Truman, 2007). However, their advancement of time, technology, and sources for their funding led to more diversification in their purposes (Gilson and Milhaupt, 2009).
Preliminarily, Fotak et al. (2008, p.4) say that “Most SWFs have been established in countries that are rich in natural resources, with oil-related SWFs being the most common ones” and other major sources of funding including “Diamonds, Copper and other raw materials in a few African and South-American countries.” Together with his fellow authors, Fotak additionally notes that, of late, there is a progressively growing new breed of SWFs that are incepted as a result of net exports. This is the group where most East-Asian SWFs fall under with the most notable ones including China and Singapore (p.4-6).
According to Truman (2007) and Sonn (2010), it is arguably documented that the first SWF was founded in 1956 by the Pacific nation of Kiribati to manage the income realized from phosphate deposits in their country. From then onwards, several others have been established, with a good number of them sprouting just recently. To attest to this fact, Drezner (2008) reports that “Close to half of the top forty SWFs have been created since 2000.”
Necessarily, it is essential to remember that, apart from a few laws that are currently in place; no prerequisite significantly dictates how SWFs should be composed. This is the reason why there is a wide range of SWFs that currently operate under varied rules, regulations and with a diverse composition of their day-to-day activities (Rumu, 2010).
Characteristics of Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)
According to Singh (2008), the six major and distinct characteristics of SWFs that distinguish them from other types of funds are: Firstly, they are state-owned and are therefore solely controlled by the government. Secondly, their management is done separately from official foreign reserves. This gives them great independence and freedom to operate above the typical overshadowing influence of governments.
Thirdly, SWFs are allowed to conduct cross-border operations. In turn, this gives them a wide foreign exposure as well as broadens their scope of investments. However, even under such cross-border operations, they are still obligated to operate under the rules of the region or country that they choose to invest in. Fourthly, investment institutions have a high-risk tolerance. Partly, this is amassed to be the reason behind their rapid growth since, in most cases, high risks present the likelihood of high profits. Fifthly, SWFs operations are not limited to contingent liabilities as is the case with other funds institutions like pensions.
Sixthly and lastly, SWFs are typically long-term investment organizations. This gives them a wide array of opportunities to patiently try different things. As a result, most of them can invest over long periods and make profits; but even in the case of getting losses, they have ample time to resuscitate themselves. These characteristics—as will be illustrated below—have been able to greatly contribute to the growth of SWFs.
Reason for the growth of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs)
Over recent times—especially from the dawn of the 21st century—, several trends combined with the unique characteristics of SWFs have been able to immensely contribute to their growth. In relation to this, Truman (2007) cumulatively says that:
The growth of SWF and similar governmental activities reflect multiple, interrelated trends in the world economy and financial system: increased global integration, substantial elimination of restrictions on international capital flows, technological innovation, sustained spectacular growth rates in many emerging-market countries, aging populations, and the expansion of pension funds and related pools of assets, recognition that diversification contributes to increased investment returns, loosening of “home bias” in investment decisions, rapid growth in foreign exchange reserves, and enormous wealth transfers from most traditional industrial countries to several emerging-market and developing countries as a consequence of the sustained rise in commodity prices in recent years.
Truman (2007) further says that the diversification of the financial markets has created more opportunities for SWFs to get better and easier ways of funding like fiscal surpluses, revenues from private businesses, and FOREX reserves. In turn, this has increased their funds, thus engaging in more investments and getting more profits.
Additional points that have been advanced by other scholars to account for the constant growth of SWFs include:
Drezner (2008) opines that the shift from bond and index funds (by SWFs investors) to riskier assets could have also contributed to their growth. He pegs this argument on the common parlance that great risk-takers increase the chances of making great profits. Some of the more risky (but highly paying) investments they have been able to engage in over the past few years include real estate, hedge firms, firm buyouts, and consumer-products companies among many others (Drezner, 2008; Fotak and Megginson, 2010).
Sobel and Holcombe (1996, p.26-28) also observe that the growth of SWFs in the USA resulted from the increased adoption of budget stabilization funds (another name for SWFs) in 1996 to reduce the fiscal stress eminent at that time based on the 1980-1982 and 1990-1991 recessions. A lot of positive output was realized from the SWFs and this greatly magnetized many economic bigwigs to form their own companies. This, in turn, laid the foundation for the formation of many other SWFs especially after the year 2000.
A few skeptics are keen to voice out their contrary concerns. To them, this growth of SWFs will only last for a while—just like all other corporate governed institutions. Their rather shy concerns are however quickly drowned with the deafening voices of scholars and researchers who project even more robust growth of the fund. An example is Butt et al. (2008) who amass that the growth of the SWFs is expected to total amount US$7.5 trillion by the year 2012. Drezner additionally supports the growth projections by other scholars by saying that “By 2015, their total valuation could range in size from $9 trillion to $16 trillion-or close to 4 percent of global asset markets.”
Even more confidently, Truman (2007) punches the final nails into the skeptics’ caskets by authoritatively saying that from the way SWFs have reportedly been in the past, and still are in the present, it is indisputable that “Most of these trends will not be reversed shortly. SWF and similar governmental activities are here to stay.” So what are some of the implications we have had and may have to contend with within the near future if things work out as projected by the scholars?
Implications of the growth of sovereign wealth funds for corporate governance structure and practices
As earlier mentioned, most of the scholarly work that has been documented with regards to SWFs growth has been subjectively on the negative implications of the funding. Very little evidence abounds in support of its positive aspects. That is why I am going to start by highlighting the positive aspects associated with the growth of SWFs, then later touch on the widely talked about negative implications.
Positive Implications
To start us off, Fotak et al. (2008, p.6) observe that despite the hyped negative implications of SWFs on the facet of corporate governance; a thorough look into the intricacies of global finance reveals that there is, in fact, more good—than bad—tidings brought by the growth of SWFs. Kotak and his co-authors have the following points to support their arguments. Primarily, most SWFs are documented to conduct their operations in ways similar to other accepted (standard) forms of funds.
For example, more than half of their overall assets are invested in fixed income securities, then another portion is directed to commercial real estate and finally, the rest is invested in domestic equities. So the issue that their growth negatively impacts corporate governance should not arise since what they do is legitimate and it fundamentally works towards the building of their nation-states—and the global economy, by an extension (p.6).
Again, Fotak et al. (2008) document sufficient evidence of apt management for most of these growing SWFs i.e. Russia’s Stabilization Fund and the China Investment Corporation (p.6-7). So according to Fotak and his associates, the few negligible funds that are constantly alleged to threaten the structure and policies of corporate governance should not be used as a yardstick that measures even the other well-performing and legitimately operating SWFs (p.7).
Additionally, despite the documentation by some researchers that the growth of SWFs disproportionately shifts the world of corporate governance as well as some political fronts; it is notably important that most of the SWFs have been reported to avoid such negating fronts. This is the reason why even to date; there is still exceptionally little information that is known by the general public concerning not just the operations of the SWFs, but even more fundamentally, their existence (p.6-7).
Lastly (and related to the previous point), despite
most of the grown SWFs have huge financial strength; their structures only allow for a few employees—which makes it very easy for them to account for their actions. This is further accentuated by the fact that many SWFs purchase non-voting shares to avoid having to participate in the voting of companies they invest in. This greatly diminishes the negative implication that most of them try using their financial investments as a trap for manipulating corporate governance control (Fotak et al., 2008, p.6-7; Gilson and Milhaupt, 2009).
Moreover, the growth of SWFs is amassed to enhance the increase in the liquidity of corporate governing bodies—especially in the private equity industry (Fotak et al., 2008, p.8). currently, the global financial market enjoys over US$3 trillion resulting from SWFs and as earlier stated, much more is expected shortly (Truman, 2007). This implies that there will be more investments and consequently, more circulation of money which translates to global profits.
As of January this year, Behrendt (2010) reported the most performing SWFs countries with the top 10 list constituting Norway, UAE, China, Kuwait, Singapore, Korea, Russia, Qatar, Libya, and Australia with the USA coming a distant 11th. Drezner (2008) also notes that recent studies predict Brazil, India, and Nigeria soon coming into play in this highly competitive and profitable funds market.
The growth of SWFs also translates into good circulation of money in the corporate sectors. This eventually creates a good in-flow of money that enables individual countries to steer their economic and social development which is an essentiality for all countries (Fotak et al., 2008, p.8).
About the above point, Truman observes that “What is distinct about these trends is that they involve a dramatic increase in the role of governments in the ownership and management of international assets.” If aptly managed and professionally calculated, this massively offers huge monetary benefits to countries with large money surpluses since they can easily invest and enjoy the profits thereof. Yet still, the ascendancy of SWFs are said to “sterilize unwanted liquidities” incorporate institutions and consequently, edge out the economic monster of fiscal stress (Fotak et al., 2008, p.8; Sobel and Holcombe, 1996, p.26-28; Wagner, 2003, p.253 & 257).
Finally and more importantly, Truman (2007) says that the growth of SWFs implies that governments generate more revenues which can be used to solve economic hiccups in the corporate sectors; alternatively, kept for future generations. Fasano (2000) supports Truman’s latter point by saying that saving up for the future is a very important role that the growth of SWFs plays in countries. To drive his point further, Fasano goes ahead and reviews SWFs operations off Norway, Alaska, Venezuela, and Chile. He then notes that in all these countries, SWFs were able to direly help during tough economic times.
However, he additionally reports that the success of the commodity stabilization fund was more efficient in countries where the government observed professionalism in the implementation of policy funds on the corporate governance sector. Levinson (1998, p.715-720) additionally supports Fasano and Truman by saying that SWFs (which he coyly refers to as “rainy day” fund) fundamentally help in watering the droughty economic times. This eventually minimizes the negative effects that are normally typical of hard and dry economic times—principally to the corporate governance institutions.
Negative implications
First and foremost, the less sophisticated nature of management in SWFs reduces the likelihood of them positively impacting corporate governance which greatly requires an apt form of leadership (Fotak, 2008, p.10-11) Truman (2007) supports Fotak et al. by noting that “in general, governments are not skilled investors. They are not good at picking winners.” That probably explains why most ventures owned or run by the governments tend to face a lot of hiccups. This however does not downplay the fact that some governments extremely know how to balance their national duties and their corporate ventures.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986, p.474) also echo the sentiments by Fotak et al. and Truman by saying that “Small shareholders lack incentives to monitor managerial performance.” This is typically the structure that is present in most SWFs.
Furthermore, Truman (2007) asserts that in the circumstance that growth is witnessed in the SWFs, corporate governments tend to become reckless and start mismanaging their economic and financial systems which eventually leads to the collapse of their countries. He, therefore, advocates for the maintenance of the current status quo—where the growth is somewhat static—thus limiting the governments from feeling complacent and consequently, mishandling the SWFs.
Moreover, there are increasingly popular concerns of most governments using the investments as a vehicle into political and economic power (Truman (2007). This deviates from the original purpose of SWFs thus reducing the effectiveness and fairness of these funds institutions. It is for this reason that most researchers fear for the further growth of such biased and unfocussed SWFs since it creates a level playground for the rise of tyrannical, authoritarian, incompetent, and corrupt leaders into political, social, or economic spheres of corporate governance (Rumu, 2010).
Kotak et al. (2008, p.3) also warn against unchecked growth of these fund organizations by saying that:
SWFs are particularly likely to impose agency costs on acquired firms since as state-owned funds their motives might not always be consistent with risk-adjusted profit maximization. In addition, by their lack of transparency, they could impose agency costs simply because of uncertainty about their behavior as shareholders. Additional agency costs would then lead to a decrease in the value of equity.
To demonstrate this, Fotak and his associates say deductively observe that:
Abnormal buy-and-hold returns on shares of equity of firms targeted by SWFs average negative 14% over two years. We interpret this result as strong evidence of SWFs leading to deteriorating firm performance and we conclude that SWFs hurt firm profitability, perhaps by imposing additional agency costs (p.3).
Similar concerns are raised by Drezner (2008) who says that the lack of transparency by some SWFs who are reportedly growing rapidly may be a cover-up for ill activities. He goes ahead and says that if such organizations continue to grow without their actions being validated; it serves as a wrong example to citizens both on the national and global fronts. In turn, this may encourage more lawlessness or fuel rebellion from the transparent people and corporate organizations; which is very detrimental to any country that direly needs to grow.
Additionally, the growth of SWFs concerning corporate governance poses the threat of equity price bubbles due to the nature of the size of their investments. As a result, this propagates the risk of having a significant decline in the demand for treasury bonds which is utterly detrimental to the upward mobility of both national and global economies (Fotak et al., 2008, p.7). This is further accentuated by the reports that most “SWFs disproportionately favor financial companies, targeting about one-third of all their investments in this sector” which leads to unfairness and thus favoring some people while working against others.
According to Truman (2007), the growth of SWFs cultivates an environment that nurtures the possibility for conflicts of interest between the governments and corporate governance owners. Such a situation is highly possible since in most countries, the influential people (who run the government), in most cases, are the same ones that have huge shares in SWFs. So a situation can easily arise where such a person is put in charge of running SWFs issues of a company where he/she is a stakeholder thus limiting objectivity. A fitting example here is 2006 ousting of Thailand’s Prime minister by a military coup after Temasek purchases shares in a company that was allegedly owned by this Prime Minister (Fotak et al., 2008, p.6).
Just like the saying goes “too much of anything is dangerous,” too much circulation or liquidity of money in corporate institutions resulting from the growth of SWFs can be very dangerous. A good example is Zimbabwe whereby too much circulation of money has had a devastating effect on their economy with their money having a very low value in the global market. Consequentially, despite numerous people having money in the tune of millions, there is very little they can do with it since it is “worthless.” Kotak et al (2008, p.7) also support this idea by saying that too much circulation of money increases the volatility of financial markets.
This volatility can lead to huge profits or huge losses depending on the timing of investments. FOREX markets are a good example of this whereby the volatility can work for, or against you. Such high risks are not so good for developing markets—and developing countries for that matter.
Teslik (2009) also articulates his concerns by saying that “Experts cite other concerns as well. For instance, a government could use SWFs to learn how companies in other countries operate, then use this information to bolster rival state-run enterprises.” Consequently, the growth of SWFs in such an instance, makes it very easy for the more financially empowered funds to easily take advantage of their helpless rivals. Tied to this is the risk of materializing financial protectionism as a response to the SWFs (Fotak et al., 2008, p.7). In turn, this encourages negative competition among different nation-states and corporate governance bodies which hinders global economic growth.
More crucially, Truman (2007) expresses his worst fears for the US if the growth of SWFs is unmonitored by saying that “The greatest risk to the US economy is that we will erect unnecessary barriers to the free flow of capital into our economy and, in the process, contribute to the erection of similar barriers in other countries to the detriment of the health and continued prosperity of the US and global economies.” Once these barriers are destroyed, it makes USA’s economy and security vulnerable to attacks from other nations who are keen on grasping the world “superpower’ privileges that are currently enjoyed by America.
However, Drezner (2008) slightly disagrees with Truman by saying that, rather than necessarily being a threat to national security and economy, SWF is merely a “Symptom” to small national “Ailments like persistent macroeconomic imbalances and a failure to diversify America’s energy supply” and if these “ailments” are not treated, Drezner continues that the growth of the SWFs will “Significantly impair democracy promotion efforts in the developing world and increase the fragility of cooperation in global finance.”
Conclusion
Having highlighted the various implications that are associated with the growth of SWFs, it is inherent that we take a step further and find ways in which we can improve or change the negative things that constantly tarnish the name of these funds. Preliminarily, we must first remember that getting an ample solution here requires a cumulative effort from both the SWFs and corporate governance sectors since both of them are equal partners. Failure from one side translates to failure on the other. So consequently, if an overall forward movement is to be ensured, then both parties must come out strongly and play their parts. Some of the scholarly ideas that have been put forwards as possible solutions include:
Truman (2007) begins by saying that “The most effective way to increase the accountability of these activities is through the establishment of a standard or a set of best practices for international investments, in general, and for sovereign wealth funds, in particular.” He goes ahead and adds that these standard practices should pertinently deal with the structure, behavior, transparency, and governance which are the key areas of SWF.
Kotak et al (2008, p.24) also observe that the various bodies concerned with the obedience of transnational SWFs laws should have candid regulations that govern the depositing and withdrawal of funds. This will be able to mitigate the problem of reckless expenditure, haphazard misuse of funds, and poor accountability from these SWFs.
To further emphasize the issue of accountability—which has been the most debated SWFs problem—, Butt et al. (2008) propose that companies who are planning to engage in the funding business should prepare and be willing to be constantly scrutinized by the media as well as other transparency organizations. This is especially with those transactions that are believed to involve vital issues of a particular country for example national economy and national security.
In addition Butt et al (2008) note that “Government policymakers are urged to balance the perceived threats of SWFs against their potential benefits, particularly their ability to provide a stabilizing source of global liquidity in the current economic environment. “ By doing that, they will not only be able to increase the prospects of profit-making in their country; but also play a key role towards ensuring global economic stability.
As for the corporate governance institutions, Gilson and Milhaupt (2009) encourage them to learn how to operate independently rather than always having to take orders from their corporate masters who sometimes mislead them. This can be done by excluding them incorporate policy boards (something that is referred to as voting suspension) so that they become free from external influences and objectively make decisions that benefit themselves, their country, and the world at large (McConvill, 2005, p.1779-1782).
The corporate governance structures are also implored to have channels that can do a background check on the SWFs they operate with as well as validate their operations by regular checks. By doing this, you get to reduce the chances of having to deal with rogue organizations or being misled into conducting businesses with criminals (Mcconvill, 2005, p.1779-1784).
It is commendable to state that various governments and independent organizations have been at the forefront of campaigns to ensure fairness, effectiveness and great accountability of both the SWFs and corporate govern bodies. the most notable ones here are the US treasury, US committee on foreign investments in the United States (CFIUS), G7, OESD, IMF, IWG, and World bank who have not only been encouraging the enterprising best practices for the SWFs; but have also incepted global channels that promote dialogue, objectivity, and cooperation from the involved parties which have, in turn, greatly improved these investment vehicles (Truman, 2007, Markheim 2008, Teslik, 2009).
The emergence of the Santiago principles in 2008 has also been able to stem the giant tree of protectionism that has been a major blockage to the success of SWFs (Morales and Brennan, p.2-3 2009). However, there is still much more that needs to be done if at all–the dream of having ultimately efficient SWFs and Corporate governance structures (by uprooting the entangling and stubborn roots in the name of SWFs inefficacies) is something that we want to actualize. So play your part, while I play mine (in this journey that direly requires a collective effort); and before we realize it, we will soon be looking back and celebrating how our industrious efforts paid off!
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